

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004037

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DOE FOR JSCHWARTZEL

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SUBJECT: REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN DOE INTERNATIONAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM AND TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY (JUNE 28, 2005)

Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reason 1.4 b/d.

¶11. (U) Summary: Members of the DOE Office of International Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara June 28, 2005 to discuss with officials of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) shared concerns for the security of radioactive materials in the region and to explore opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of radiological threat reduction. Following detailed discussions it was agreed that the initial area of Radiological Threat Reduction cooperation with Turkey should focus on the problem of radiological safety in Iraq and the high volume of radioactive contaminated material that is stopped at Iraq's borders. DOE would explore the possibility of involving Jordan as well. (Comment: Concurrent independent activities by DOE (IRTR) and State complement this meeting in gaining further regional cooperation with Iraq.) End Summary.

¶12. (U) Members of the DOE Office of International Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara June 28, 2005 to meet with officials of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). The purpose of the visit was to conduct initial meetings with TAEK to discuss shared concerns for the security of radioactive materials and to explore opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of radiological threat reduction. Joseph Schwartzel from the DOE HQ, Stephen Musolino from Brookhaven National Laboratory and EXBS Advisor comprised the U.S. delegations which met with TAEK officials. Schwartzel outlined IRTR's responsibilities and accomplishments. These include ongoing projects with over 40 countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally with IAEA or Interpol, across a spectrum of radiological threat reduction activities including: regional partnerships, technical exchanges, cooperation projects with Interpol and the IAEA, and physical security work at a variety of facilities, like medical clinics, irradiation facilities, and storage facilities in over 30 countries.

¶13. (U) The primary Turkish interlocutor was the TAEK President Mr. Okay Cakiroglu. Cakiroglu explained TAEK's active approach towards radiological threat reduction in Turkey with numerous activities under the Turkish National Security Strategic Plan for Vulnerable Radiological Sources, including radiological source inventory, increased facility security measures, regional seminars conducted with IAEA, national training courses, installation of radiation detectors and an independent Security Committee at TAEK. Cakiroglu also explained steps Turkey has taken to control radioactive materials within their borders, including regulations, laws, licensee compliance inspection, training, and cooperation with police and customs officials. Cakiroglu concluded his remarks by commenting that while the United States is now seeking Turkey's assistance in the area of Radiological Threat Reduction within the region and is acknowledging Turkey's position as a leader in the Region, it is strange that the United States does not appear to be interested in being involved in the development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy in Turkey due to the lack of effort to ratify the 5-year old Agreement with Turkey for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

¶14. (U) Cakiroglu then moved on to discuss Turkey's primary radiological concern: the lack of control of radiological materials by its neighbor, Iraq. Turkey has experienced a significant number of radioactive contaminated shipments arriving at its border crossing with Iraq since June 2003. This most frequently involves contaminated scrap metal shipments originating in Iraq. Turkish authorities detect the radioactive material contained in truck cargo, and then deny the vehicle entry into Turkey. Frequently the contaminated materials are simply dumped along the side of the road inside Iraq, creating both a radiological security and safety problem. This situation has probably resulted in radioactive sources being left in an uncontrolled manner in these debris piles or elsewhere in Iraq. While, TAEK recognizes this problem, they have not been able to establish any communications with the relative nuclear authority in Iraq.

¶15. (C) EXBS Advisor inquired about the relationship that TAEK has with other neighboring government Nuclear Authorities. Cakiroglu responded that he has been encouraged

by the Turkish government to establish communications with the Armenia Nuclear Authority, mainly due to close proximity of an Armenia nuclear power plant to the Turkish border. Although, he has attempted to establish communication both through Georgia and the IAEA, none of his attempts have succeeded. Cakiroglu added that he has been instructed not to attempt to establish communication with the Iranian Nuclear Authority, due in large part to the suspicion that Iran could be involved in violations of IAEA and UN mandates against non-proliferation and uranium enrichment and Turkey does not want to appear to condone this activity. Finally, Cakiroglu stated that Turkey's relationship with Greece, Syria, Bulgaria and Georgia are good and that they do share information when appropriate. Turkey also has worked cooperatively with authorities in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations concerning nuclear safety.

16. (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu agreed that the first efforts of radiological threat reduction cooperation should focus on ways to assist the Iraqi government to achieve better control of radioactive materials in Iraq. Cakiroglu stated that TAEK has resources, facilities and expertise to train Iraqis in the principles of radiological safety, security, regulation and control. TAEK is also willing to host or assist in organizing conferences, seminars and training courses for Iraqis to share expertise in security and control of radioactive material.

17. (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu concluded the meeting by agreeing that IRTR and TAEK would cooperatively develop a plan of action and milestones to assist the Iraqi government to achieve positive control of radioactive materials within Iraq, prevent contaminated shipments from leaving Iraq or being dumped close to their borders. DOE would also investigate the inclusion of the Jordanian Nuclear Authority in these activities, in hopes that a regional effort would be more successful in Iraq. Once this issues with Iraq has been brought under control, Cakiroglu stated, it will be easier for TAEK to focus its attention on more regional activities to reduce the radiological threat.

18. (U) DOE/IRTR cleared this message.
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